

The latest developments in European negotiations/programming in the field of R&I

February 2026

Muriel Dal Pont Legrand – Fabrice Lemoine – Éric Foucher – Nicolas Fiessinger

At the start of 2026, it is useful to take stock of (i) the ongoing negotiations on future European programmes and (ii) other communications expected this year. Stakeholders in the research and innovation ecosystem (academic stakeholders — European university associations), European industry associations (European Roundtable for Industries, Business Europe), the Member States of the Council, etc., have all rallied around the main lines of thinking for the next framework programme (FP10), the new competitiveness fund (ECF), and the Erasmus+ programme. At the same time, negotiations in the Council are continuing. The European Parliament will soon vote on its recommendations based on the proposals of the respective rapporteurs¹.

A busy institutional agenda with an uncertain outcome accompanies this strategic thinking. Last July, the European Commission published its proposals on the FP10 and the ECF with a proposed budget of €175.3 billion at current prices for the FP10, an increase of 73%, and €234 billion for the ECF. These amounts are far from the €220 billion requested in the Draghi report for the FP10 and the €800 billion in annual investment for the competitiveness of EU industries, but at this stage they cannot be taken for granted: some Member States are calling for a downward revision of the budget, while rapporteurs in the European Parliament are calling for a substantial revision and an increase.

In this note, we review the progress of discussions and identify outstanding issues whose resolution will determine the success of future programmes. The stakes for FP10 are considerable: it is taking place in a tense international geopolitical context, which requires efficiency and synergy between industrial and research strategies. While the aim remains to support excellence in research, its impact must be increased; while healthy competition is the guarantee of the effectiveness of the solutions adopted in Europe, European sovereignty must be regained in both industry and research. This cannot be achieved without a concerted and committed European strategy for strong research guaranteeing a high-performing autonomous industry in Europe.

¹ The respective rapporteurs are: Elher – Competitiveness Fund and FP10; Nina Galvez – FP10 shadow; Repasi – ECF; Ivan Ijabs – FP10; Nikkos Poppas – FP10; Julie Rechagneux – FP10; Anne Zeleska – PIE; Specific programme (Repasi, N. Niinstö.)

Table des matières

Summary	1
1. State of the Art.....	3
2. FP10.....	4
3. FP10 – ECF articulation.....	6
4. Private financing dilemma.....	8
5. Duale-use.....	8
6. Erasmus, ECF, and competencies.....	10
7. Other	11
8. Annexe.....	11

1. State of the Art

FP10 (10th Framework Programme for Research and Innovation)

- **Budget:** The European Commission is proposing a budget of €175.3 billion for FP10, which is below the €220 billion recommended by the Draghi report. Given this discrepancy, the debate continues: to date, some Member States are calling for a reduction in this budget, while the European Parliament is still negotiating an increase.
- **Infrastructure costs:** At this stage, the EC is proposing to finance 25% of the building costs of research and technological infrastructure.
- **Advanced Innovation Challenge (AIC):** The AIC programme has been created within the European Innovation Council (EIC) to support disruptive technologies, such as the digital (AI, microprocessors, quantum) and health sectors.
- **Knowledge triangle and EIT:** The concept of the knowledge triangle is linked to the EIT, but neither the allocation of resources nor the question of the relationship between the programmes supported by the EIT and the European Innovation Ecosystems (EIE) has been specified at this stage.
- **Innovation hubs:** There is tension between supporting less developed regions, as envisaged by the European Commission, and concentrating resources on hubs of excellence (as expressed by the recent Danish Presidency).
- **Partnerships:** There is a desire to streamline these programmes; the number of partnerships to be retained is still under discussion, with a decision expected by the end of 2026.

FP10 – ECF (European Competitiveness Fund) coordination

- **Governance and budget:** FP10 and the ECF are closely linked, with a transfer of collaborative research funding from the former pillar 2 of FP 9 to the ECF. This transition raises questions about both the budget and governance. The objectives and resources of these two programmes need clarification. While some Member States, such as France, are calling for better integration of research and innovation stakeholders, with joint governance between FP10 and the ECF, the details still need to be discussed.
- **Societal aspects:** Societal challenges in R&I remain under the governance of FP10, but the themes that will be eligible for funding remain to be clarified.

Dual research

- **Defence and security:** In the current geopolitical context, defence and 'dual' research have become European priorities. A distinction will have to be made between 'dual research' and 'military research', and clarification will be needed on how such research would affect the participation of certain third countries in the framework programme.
- **Research security:** The "Europe first" principle and the conditions of access for third countries are under discussion and could be significantly redefined. It will undoubtedly be necessary to broaden the scope of these discussions, which are still exclusively intra-European, to include our main international partners.

Erasmus, EIC, and Skills

- **Erasmus+, ECF and FP10 synergies:** The proposed budget for Erasmus+ 2028-2034 is €40.8 billion, an increase of 50% compared to the previous period. This extremely positive outlook should not obscure the fundamental issues: it is necessary to clarify the relationship between Erasmus+, FP10, and the CEF, and in particular to specify which funds will be (potentially) available to European university alliances or skills academies.
- **European university alliances:** The funding of alliances remains a subject of debate. There are differences of opinion on how to support their role in the European research landscape.

To date, negotiations have focused on three main pillars: agriculture, defence, and the relative importance of industry and research in the MFF. The outcome of the negotiations will depend on the balance of power between Member States on these three issues.

2. FP10

About FP10, a competitiveness council meeting is expected to take place at the end of February 2026. Initial discussions within the European Parliament's ITRE (Industry, Research and Energy) committee began at the end of January 2026, and experts are being consulted and will continue to be consulted in the coming months to express their views on FP10. A first draft of Christian Ehler's (rapporteur) proposal – covering both FP10 and the ECF – is expected in March 2026. The vote in the European Parliament plenary is scheduled for the end of 2026, followed by negotiations between the Parliament, the Council, and the Commission.

More specifically:

- Several European university associations, in their amendments of 1 December 2025², reject the European Commission's (EC) proposal to cover up to 25% (now 20%) of the cost of building (research and technological) infrastructure through FP10³. These associations believe that FP10 should remain a research and innovation programme, with funding focused on supporting scientific excellence, collaborative research, and innovation activities. Financing for the strengthening of European research and technology infrastructure, while a strategic priority, can be supported by other, more appropriate EU instruments, such as Invest EU. The budget for funding this infrastructure is estimated at between €10 billion and €11 billion. Considering that 20% of the funding would come from the Commission, some Member States, including Denmark, believe it would be worthwhile to involve private investors for the remaining 80%. This arrangement would enable the EC to co-define some of its priorities with the private sector and Member States, thereby creating an environment (and conditions) for effective cooperation.

To what extent can FP10 finance R&I programmes independently of research and innovation infrastructure funding? What alternative instruments (such as InvestEU) could be mobilised to cover the €10-11 billion needed? How can these two programmes be coordinated?

This EC proposal to co-finance 20% implies defining strategic priorities for financing the remaining 80% through both public and private funds. How can this cooperation be made attractive to the private sector without risking losing the objectives of public policy on industry and R&I?

- The direction of the **MSCA** programme, which aims to support priority sectors announced by the EC at the end of 2025, has not been decided at this stage. Does this mean that the project has been abandoned, or that a similar proposal – i.e., focusing on the mobility of young researchers – will be put forward, but this time within the ECF?
- The creation by the EC of an **Advanced Innovation Challenge** (AIC) as a 'pilot project' within the EIC could be one of the links between FP10 and the EFC. This AIC would emerge in part from the merger of two existing tools, Pathfinder and Transition, and would be tasked with

² Proposed joint amendments to the FP10 legal texts. [Joint-Amendments-FP10_01.12.2025.pdf](#)

³ *Ibid.*

supporting the transition from low TRLs to higher ones (5/6) in cutting-edge sectors where disruptive innovations are emerging.

- To encourage the emergence of these disruptive innovations, the AIC will target key cross-cutting technologies (the digital sector (AI, microprocessors, and quantum technology) and health (health/non-animal testing)). This approach is based on close monitoring by a team of project managers, enabling the implementation of a go/no-go policy. This initiative would mobilise €29 million per year (€4 million for part 1, €25 million for part 2), align the policies of the various national agencies and the EIC, and aim, among other things, to reduce the inefficiencies caused by programmes designed and deployed in silos.
- Concerning the **knowledge triangle**, although this concept has so far been linked to the programmes of the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT), the latter is not mentioned in the EC's proposals. The knowledge triangle is integrated into the European Innovation Ecosystems (EIE) programme. Questions remain about the distribution of resources within this programme. Some stakeholders are calling for a financial rebalancing in favour of innovation hubs rather than focusing funding exclusively on the EIT. To avoid the creation of parallel ecosystems and optimise the impact of policies, coordination between the EIT and the EIE is essential. Finally, it should be noted that some Member States are opposed to the renewal of the EIT, as is MEP C. Ehler, who questions the relevance of certain KICs (Climate, etc.).

Why does the European Commission's proposal highlight the “knowledge triangle” without explicitly mentioning the EIT? How can this institute be integrated into European innovation ecosystems (EIE) and avoid duplication with other instruments?

- The issue of innovation hubs is back in the spotlight. Initially designed to support less developed regions, the Danish Presidency has emphasised the need to focus on hubs of excellence, repositioning this instrument as a lever for excellence. This choice seems all the more necessary (and strategic) given that no European hub ranks among the world's top ten in quantum technology.
- This tension between territorial equity and excellence raises a coordination challenge: how can the ambition of the EIT be reconciled with that of the EIC, which supports the most competitive players? Coordination between these two instruments is essential to avoid overlap in mentoring and investor networking and to ensure that each initiative brings distinct and complementary value.
- In short, it will be necessary to ensure that synergies in terms of the use of research results and scaling up are achieved between the ECF, EIT, EIC, and EIE programmes so that innovations reach the markets.
- Within the ecosystems, there are no specific measures planned to strengthen links between laboratories of excellence (thematic). However, this type of programme would make it possible to mobilise European alliances, among other things, which Member States would like to see.

- Concerning **missions**, the Danish Presidency has asked for co-financing via the ECF to be considered.
- About **moonshots**⁴, some Member States would like to see them removed from the EC proposal. They should remain outside the scope of regulation, which makes them vulnerable.

3. FP10 – ECF articulation

Beyond the content of their respective programmes, the main issue remains the overall coordination between FP10 and the ECF. In this context, several points and considerations are worth mentioning:

The next framework programme marks a turning point: collaborative research, previously funded by Pillar 2 of Horizon Europe, will be integrated into the European Competitiveness Fund (ECF). Despite this transfer, it will remain the main beneficiary of FP10 funding, with an increased budget of €22.4 billion (Article 6 of the Horizon Europe programme). However, this increase is accompanied by a reduction in its relative share of the overall budget, from 56% to 43%. This development raises two distinct issues: on the one hand, the budgetary question, which depends on the European Council, and on the other hand, the governance of the programmes (FP10 and ECF), which is the responsibility of the Competitiveness Council. It is crucial to distinguish between these two dimensions to ensure the implementation of European priorities in research and innovation.

For many Member States, effective governance will only result from a clarification of strategic priorities. The EC is being asked to establish a “process” to prevent each Member State from making its own proposals and to ensure that a concerted solution is incorporated into the next version of FP10.

Beyond the effectiveness of the consultation process itself, the aim is to ensure convergence between national and European strategies. During discussions in the European Parliament's Committee on Budgets (BUDG) on 28 January, experts and some MEPs reaffirmed the need to mobilise ECF resources on identified strategic priorities. The danger would be to preserve too many topics or to centralise financial efforts on “middle” technologies at the expense of “high” technologies, which are essential links for competitive European industries. With this in mind, MEP Elher proposes a more bottom-up approach. This would require identifying a decision-making process, but it does not appear to be the route currently favoured by the European Parliament's Budget Committee.

While the standalone nature of FP10 has been confirmed, questions remain about how it will interact with the ECF. The latter will be managed jointly by DG CLIMA (Clean Transition and Decarbonisation of Industry), DG CONNECT (Digital Leadership), DG HEALTH (Health, Biotechnology, Agriculture and Bioeconomy), and DG DEFI (Resilience, Security, Defence and Space Industries). DG GROW will oversee the four windows and will lead the entire ECF.

The EC proposal on the structure of the ECF mentions a strategic stakeholder board responsible for advising on the overall direction of the ECF. This board would be responsible for determining strategic project portfolios within and between the various activities of the ECF, as well as sub-optimal investment situations that could be corrected in the implementation of the ECF. This board will be

⁴ “The Horizon Europe programme could fund the research and innovation aspects of ambitious projects with a strong scientific component, thereby stimulating value creation across the EU and strategic autonomy”. The projects range from quantum computing and next-generation artificial intelligence to regenerative medicine, clean aviation, and particle physics. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0543>

complemented by an emerging technologies observatory, although its structure, functioning, and governance are not mentioned in the current proposal⁵.

How can we ensure the integration of R&I stakeholders into the governance of the EFC, when academic stakeholders, such as European university associations, are calling for integrated governance in the FP10?

France advocates the creation of R&I sub-groups within the EFC governance structure. The idea would be to have a group of R&I experts within the EFC for each of the four windows. The functioning of cluster 4 would serve as a reference. The aim would be to coordinate FP10 and EFC programmes to strengthen the impact of research within strategic sectors. Other stakeholders, such as European university associations, wish to maintain autonomous FP10 governance (see Amendments⁶). The governance of the ECF, therefore, remains unclear, which impacts negotiations, including those relating to dual use.

The Spanish authorities are proposing an operational and programmatic separation within the ECF with the establishment of two programme committees per window. This separation would preserve the functional integration between the two dimensions, ensuring that research activities continue to promote competitiveness, including that of industry. According to the Spanish proposal, splitting into two complementary work programmes (each with distinct characteristics) does not mean that the R&I component would not contribute to industry or to the application of new technologies on the market. Four new R&I committees would be created, one for each strand (Art. 83). These R&I committees would serve as a mechanism for adapting R&I areas to innovation needs not identified in Article 3.2 or for further developing the objectives of each strand.

For the Spanish authorities, this approach would allow for a balanced combination of “bottom-up” collaborative research and “top-down” strategic guidance, which will be useful in achieving the objectives of the EFC. Finally, this vision is shared by other stakeholders, and most recently by European university associations and MEPs working on the scenario of a dual programme committee under the EFC.

It should be noted that the society component (HSS) remains under the governance of FP10, with no agreement on the topics to be funded. The Danish Presidency did not wish to give further details on its content (which will also be linked to democracy).

More cross-cutting issues remain:

Partnerships: the three partnership types would be retained, but the number of partnerships selected remains to be determined. This issue should be decided by the end of 2026.

Innovation ecosystems are the key lever for European competitiveness in the future. To make them a decisive asset, ECF funds — through its four funding windows — must prioritise the most promising ecosystems, which focus on strategic technologies likely to strengthen Europe's position on the world stage. This approach requires an ambitious sectoral approach based on two pillars: on the one hand, the rigorous identification of critical technology areas; on the other hand, the implementation of an

⁵ [EUR-Lex - 52025PC0555R\(01\) - EN - EUR-Lex](#)

⁶ Ibid.

effective European preference, ensuring that public investment primarily supports players capable of creating sustainable competitive advantages in Europe.

There is a real risk that, without **proactive governance**, ECF funds could be captured by traditional industrial sectors, to the detriment of disruptive innovations. To avoid this situation, some propose establishing a mechanism to identify promising sectors that can continuously detect emerging opportunities and accelerate the diffusion of new technologies to established industries. Such a strategy would modernise the European industrial fabric, from the most mature to the most innovative sectors: the aim is to create a knock-on effect on employment and growth, while making innovation ecosystems an inclusive and transformative driver for the entire economy.

Added to this is the need, highlighted by European associations (Business Europe and ERT), to establish national industrial policies that are coordinated between Member States rather than based on competition.

4. Private financing dilemma

R&I stakeholders point out that the objectives will require significant financial resources. However, Member States will not mobilise additional funds, nor will they increase the EU's own resources. It is therefore necessary to mobilise private investment.

Several possibilities are available, but ultimately, they must support risk-taking in innovation financing. The EIB has been asked to step in to finance projects where private actors are reluctant to do so. However, due to its status as a bank, the EIB is limited in its risk-taking. To overcome this limitation, risk-taking must be made attractive to private investors. Other MEPs believe that, beyond the solutions envisaged to stimulate public/private financing, it will be impossible to achieve the objectives of competitiveness and sovereignty without new borrowing by Member States. This issue has given rise to opposition.

How can risk-taking be made attractive to private investors, and how can institutions such as the EIB help to de-risk these investments, at least partially, to mobilise the significant funding that alone will enable Europe to achieve its ambitious objectives? To what extent would borrowing by Member States be essential (or complementary) to ensure the effectiveness of this competitiveness policy and, ultimately, to guarantee European sovereignty? In the current context, would it be possible to overcome the reluctance to mobilise more public funds? Finally, how can these two types of financing be coordinated?

5. Dual-use

In the current geopolitical context, certain issues have now come to the fore. This is the case for defence funding and dual-use research, as evidenced by the amounts allocated respectively, in the FP10, the ECF, and the “Defence Readiness Omnibus”⁷ via the legislative package proposed by the

⁷ https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/defence-readiness-omnibus_en

European Commission aimed at accelerating investment in defence and strengthening the European Union's industrial and technological defence base⁸.

Firstly, there is the question of the scope of this policy. Defence/military research falls under the control of the ECF, and the United Kingdom is not one of the third countries that can join it; the list is restrictive and includes Norway and Ukraine, among others.

Then there is the practical implementation of these programmes. France has evolved on the issue of dual use (certain technologies are now considered dual use by default). While it is necessary to strengthen security in the programme (point 22.5), the implementation modalities are not specified in the European Commission's latest proposal. Furthermore, dual-use must impose a fluidity of knowledge and innovation in both directions, i.e., from military to civil applications and vice versa. Member States are awaiting more specific proposals from the EC⁹.

Debates on dual-use can lead to more pragmatic approaches if integrated into a dual comitology approach. The aim would be to identify potentially dual-use projects upstream and on a case-by-case basis. This debate leads to reflection on the method to be put in place to strengthen links between academia and the defence sector, as well as the issue of competencies.

Research security – discussions focus on the “Europe first” principle and access for third countries. The Commission and Member States wish to exclude problematic countries and have clear wording, while leaving room for the involvement of ‘trusted partners’ where possible. The procedure has not yet been clearly defined: while the principle is simple, it could become complex and, depending on the subject matter, lead to the exclusion of certain third countries. This is an issue on which associated and third countries will try to exert influence: they will raise their concerns through some Member States to be included in these cooperation arrangements.

The optimal strategy would be to adopt a variable position depending on the areas concerned. As C. Elher points out, a differentiated approach is needed for the ECF. FP10 must remain broadly open to associated and third countries to maintain the collaborative and inclusive dimension that characterises European framework programmes and guarantees research excellence. This openness is essential for strengthening international partnerships, promoting scientific exchanges, and responding to global challenges. The issue of reciprocity is important, as is that of the values of third countries. On the other hand, the ECF must pursue more targeted objectives, focused on the strategic competitiveness of the European Union. In this context, a more restrictive approach geared towards the EU's economic and technological interests would be necessary to ensure that public investment supports European players, strengthening (i) their position on the world stage and (ii) European sovereignty in these target areas.

⁸ The resilience, security, defence and space industries window will receive €6 billion in FP10 and €125 billion in the ECF. This covers space programmes, critical raw materials, the defence industrial base and civil security. https://commission.europa.eu/publications/horizon-europe_en & https://commission.europa.eu/publications/european-competitiveness-fund_en?prefLang=fr

⁹ Academic stakeholders are questioning the conditions for implementing such a system. The University of Lorraine, for example, is calling for a European framework governing dual-use research that meets defence needs and challenges while preserving academic freedom and ensuring an appropriate level of research data sharing. It is also a question of harmonising European rules and promoting structured dialogue between the academic world and the defence sector through a genuine platform for the exchange of research results, for example by creating a European academy of expertise dedicated to dual-use research.

What about involving partners in defining dual-use rules? How can consistency be ensured between countries associated with the FP10 and those not associated with the ECF on projects of common interest/for which funding would come from both funds?

6. Erasmus, ECF, and competencies

The proposed funding for the Erasmus+ programme for 2028-2034, amounting to €40.8 billion, remains below the expected increase in the overall EU budget, which is set to almost double.

Negotiations on the programme are ongoing, with the proposal due to be examined by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. The aim is to reach an agreement by the end of 2027.

Questions remain unanswered:

- The links with the Competitiveness Fund and FP10 remain to be clarified. Roxana Minzatu, European Commissioner for Education, Social Rights and Quality Jobs, has already mentioned her desire to link Erasmus+ with Horizon Europe¹⁰ and the Competitiveness Fund. For the Horizon Europe programme, Commissioner Zaharieva has not opened the door to FP10, particularly regarding funding research by European alliances. This is also MEP Ehler's position.
- About **skills** and links with the Erasmus+ programme, synergies are expected with the ECF. Commissioner Roxana Minzatu's cabinet is also considering interaction between the ECF and Erasmus+ in the form of a top-up. This also applies to skills academies, which are expected to be co-financed through the ECF (via the four windows) without any certainty that their operation will be harmonised. The establishment of genuine interaction between the Erasmus programme/skills and the ECF would ensure greater consistency and strengthen the links between research, innovation, and training.
- The **funding of European university** alliances remains a subject of unresolved debate, even though their role in building a European area of higher education, research, and innovation is recognised. For Commissioner Roxana Minzatu, these alliances — characterised by their innovative model (pooling of infrastructure, joint research programmes, joint supervision of theses, postdoctoral fellowships, etc.) — embody collective excellence and should benefit from combined support from the Horizon Europe programme and the Competitiveness Fund. The Commissioner's office proposes to finance the development of the R&I ecosystems of alliance members and their participation in research and technological infrastructures to develop R&I capacity, without specifying the funds (ECF, FP10?). It emphasises the need for enhanced synergies to maximise their impact. This vision is not universally accepted. The DG R&I, led by Commissioner Zaharieva, as well as European university associations (as evidenced by their amendments) and Christian Ehler, oppose this approach. Conversely, France Universités (FU) proposes an alternative approach: integrating support for alliances via innovation ecosystems or a mechanism inspired by the 'ERC for institutions', which would enable the financing of cooperation between laboratories of excellence, thus bridging the gap between individual ERC grants and collaborative research. Discussions on funding relationships within the innovation ecosystems of European Universities are ongoing. This would involve amending the innovation ecosystems to include funding to link ecosystems, providing an

¹⁰ Commissioner Zaharieva seems less interested in such synergies. For example, she refuses to fund research into alliances.



indirect entry point for alliances. The aim would be to create favourable framework conditions for their participation, in particular through mechanisms dedicated to ecosystems, without creating a programme specifically dedicated to them.

7. Other

In 2026, the European Commission will present several important proposals, directives, and legislation. These include the Quantum Act and the Raw Material Centre (both expected in Q2 2026), the 28th regime for companies (EU. Inc., as announced in Davos by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen), and the ERA Act (expected in Q3 2026). It is also worth noting the view of C. Ehler, who remains sceptical about the effects of FP10 and the ECF if Europeans fail to establish a genuine European market, whether global or thematic, which is the only way to enable businesses to develop in the EU.

8. Annexe: *FP10 Timetable*

Timeframe	Event / Milestone	Details/ comments
July 16 2025	Commission proposals	The European Commission has adopted its proposals for the next MFF and for Horizon Europe 2028-34.
December 1	Stakeholders Joint Position Paper	An alliance of all major European research representative organisations has presented their shared objectives and key proposals for Horizon Europe 2028-34 and a detailed list of jointly proposed amendments to the Horizon Europe 2028-34 legal acts.
December 9	Competitiveness Council (research ministers) Progress report	The Competitiveness Council, comprising the research ministers of the Member States, heard a progress report from Denmark. Presidency on the negotiations in the Research Working Party (where the research attachés of the Member States meet) on Horizon Europe 2028-34 legal acts.
January 1 2026	Council Start of Cyprus Presidency	
January 28	Parliament ITRE Committee Meeting	The ITRE (Industry, Research and Energy) committee is holding its first exchange of views on the next Horizon Europe programme.



February 12	Informal EU leaders' retreat	Possible discussion about the MFF.
February 27	Competitiveness Council (research ministers) Possible meeting	This is the tentative date for the Competitiveness Council (Research) meeting, according to the Cyprus Presidency calendar.
End of February	Parliament Hearing	Experts invited to share opinions on the Horizon Europe programme with the Parliament.
March 3	Parliament Horizon Draft Report	Christian Ehler (Parliament rapporteur) will submit the draft report on Horizon Europe for translation.
March 5-6	EURO HPC Summit	
March 19-20	European Council (heads of state or government) ¹¹	Possible discussions about the MFF.
March 30–31	Council Informal meeting of research ministers	An informal meeting of research ministers is taking place in Cyprus.
End of March	Parliament Committee Consideration	The draft report on Horizon Europe is ready for committee review, and members will be submitting their amendments.
First semester 2026	28 th regime for Companies; EU Innovation Act; Cloud and AI development Act; Chips Act	
April 23-24	Informal meeting of heads of state or government	Informal meeting of EU leaders in Cyprus - potential discussion about the MFF.
May 29	Competitiveness Council (research ministers)	This is the only formal Competitiveness Council (Research) meeting of the Cyprus Presidency. This is the crucial meeting at which ministers will attempt to reach a 'partial general approach' (consensus on the legal texts, excluding the budget).
June 18-19	European Council (heads of state or government)	Possible discussions about MFF.
June 22-23	ESRI Forum	
July 1	Council Start of Irish Presidency	

¹¹ EU leaders meet at least four times a year, usually in March, June, October and December.



Second semester 2026	Public Procurement Act; Quantum Act; Critical Raw Material Centre;	
Summer	Parliament Vote in the ITRE Committee	The report on Horizon Europe is to be approved by the ITRE Committee.
October 5	Parliament First reading vote in plenary	The report on Horizon Europe is to be approved by the Parliament.
October	Negotiations	Negotiations between the Parliament, Council, and Commission regarding Horizon Europe are expected to begin.
October	European Council (heads of state or government)	Possible discussions about the MFF.
Third semester 2026	ERA Act; EU Biotech Act; Energy Union Package	
December	European Council (heads of state or government)	Possible discussions about the MFF.
Fourth semester 2026	Advanced Material Act	
January 1 2027	Council Start of Lithuanian Presidency	
July 1	Council Start of Greek Presidency	
January 1 2028	Start of Horizon Europe 2028-34	